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What are conspiracy theories? And what, if  anything, is epistemically wrong with them? I offer an account 
on which conspiracy theories are a unique way of  holding a belief  in a conspiracy. Specifically, I take con-
spiracy theories to be self-insulating beliefs in conspiracies. On this view, conspiracy theorists have their con-
spiratorial beliefs in a way that is immune to revision by counter-evidence. I argue that conspiracy theories 
are always irrational. Although conspiracy theories involve an expectation to encounter some seemingly 
disconfirming evidence (allegedly planted by the conspirators), resistance to all counter-evidence cannot be 
justified on these grounds. 
1. Introduction 
The moon landing was faked. 9/11 was an inside job. Secret societies control the world. Immigration 
is a plan of  the political elite aimed at extinguishing the white race. These are just a few examples of  wi-
dely believed conspiracy theories (at least more widely than one would have hoped). To most, conspiracy 
theories are wacky stories, the evidence for which is allegedly given in YouTube videos where eccentric 
characters point out long series of  coincidences that the official accounts cannot account for. When we 
call these theories ‘conspiracy theories’, we often use the term pejoratively to indicate theories that 
should not be believed, and perhaps should be met with ridicule. Similarly, the public debate about con-
spiracy theories assumes that conspiracy theories are fictions that undermine the trust required for the 
spread of  knowledge in our societies, and that belief  in such theories is inappropriate.  
But what are conspiracy theories, exactly? And what is epistemically wrong with them? In this paper I 
offer a joint answer to these two questions that is based on two observations: (i) many explanations that 
involve conspiracies are not to be considered conspiracy theories, and (ii) whatever distinguishes conspi-
racy theories from mere theories that involve conspiracies makes the former epistemically problematic. 
Contrary to those who argue that conspiracy theories are just explanations of  events that involve conspi-
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racies,  I maintain that conspiracy theories are not theories (or explanations) at all.  Instead, I take ‘con1 2 -
spiracy theory’ to refer to a particular way of  holding a belief  in the existence of  a conspiracy. The atti-
tude of  the believer, rather than any feature of  the theory, determines whether a person’s belief  in a 
conspiracy is a conspiracy theory or not. 
Here is a sketch of  the account to come. There is an interesting feature that we observe in people 
who defend conspiracy theories. It seems to be the case that, no matter what evidence we present to 
them against their theory, they’ll find a way to dismiss it. I take this to be a central characteristic of  con-
spiracy theories; they give rise to this dismissive epistemic behavior. Some have argued that the resistance 
to disconfirming evidence is not, per se, a problematic feature of  conspiracy theories (Keeley 1999; Den-
tith 2017; Harris 2018). The reason behind this claim seems to be that if  a conspiracy is going on, the 
conspirators would be trying to cover it up. Hence, misleading counter-evidence is to be expected. The 
resistance to counter-evidence typical of  conspiracy theorizing seems to be warranted by the kind of  
thing conspiracies are, namely, plots by a group of  people who are trying to keep their intentions and 
actions secret. I will argue that the simple explanation of  this feature of  conspiracy theories is mislead-
ing. While it is true that belief  in a conspiracy warrants a certain type of  resistance to counter-evidence, I 
argue that the evidential insulation typical of  conspiracy theories makes them epistemically problematic.  
I begin in §2 with a discussion of  the methodology employed in the conspiracy theory debate, and I 
motivate the need for a negatively loaded conception of  conspiracy theories that tracks the same phe-
nomenon as the ordinary expression ‘conspiracy theory’. In §3 I present my account of  conspiracy the-
ory as a self-insulated belief  in the existence of  a conspiracy. In §4, I argue that conspiracy theories so 
understood are epistemically irrational. In §5, I address three objections to my view. 
2. Conspiracy theories and philosophical methodology 
 For instance, Pigden (1995); Keeley (1999); Basham (2001); Räikkä (2009); Buenting & Taylor (2010); Dentith 1
(2014); Harris (2018).
 In line with the literature on conspiracy theories, I use ‘theory’ and ‘explanation’ as synonyms, despite the obvi2 -
ous differences between the two.
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First, a word about the methodology in the discussion ahead. Typically, when giving an account of  
conspiracy theories, the first step is to provide a definition of  ‘conspiracy theory’. But what are we doing 
when defining the expression ‘conspiracy theory’? And what constraints should we have in mind? The 
kind of  definition I am after is aimed at revising the ordinary expression of  ‘conspiracy theory’ in order 
to help advance the understanding of  a phenomenon that has become the object of  much academic and 
public discussion—the phenomenon of  people believing absurd theories about conspiracies, and believ-
ing them to be the best explanations of  the available evidence.  I am thinking of  theories such as the 3
fake moon landing, flat earth, or the Illuminati controlling the world. I will not discuss the rationality of  
any of  these theories in particular, but I will assume that when we talk about conspiracy theories, we 
have in mind outlandish theories like these. However, our natural language intuitions about conspiracy 
theories seem rather confused. It is not clear what people mean by ‘conspiracy theory’, and what exactly 
makes them theories that should not be believed. My account looks to maintain the epistemically negat-
ive connotation that characterizes the current meaning of  ‘conspiracy theory’, while making this expres-
sion clear, more precise, and suited to be employed in empirical studies of  the phenomenon of  conspir-
acy theorizing.  4
Even though explicit mentions of  philosophical methodology are quite rare in the debate, there 
seems to be a trend in the philosophical literature about conspiracy theories to adopt a revisionary defin-
ition of  conspiracy theories as any theory that involves a conspiracy.  While it is commonly recognized 5
that ‘conspiracy theory’ is ordinarily used to indicate a special type of  theories about conspiracies, and 
that it is a negatively loaded expression, most philosophers working on the topic agree that ‘conspiracy 
theory’ should be defined as any explanation of  an event that cites a conspiracy.  One reason that is of6 -
 While the perception and discussion of  the phenomenon of  conspiracy theories seem to have become more 3
prominent in recent years, empirical data suggests that the phenomenon itself  has not. See, for instance, van 
Prooijen & Douglas (2017). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.
 For an empirical study regarding the negative meaning of  the expression ‘conspiracy theory’ and a discussion of  4
its consequences for the conceptual engineering of  ‘conspiracy theory’ see Napolitano & Reuter (MS).
 One person who does discuss the methodology of  giving an account of  conspiracy theories is David Coady 5
(2018a). He argues that, given the ambiguous use of  the expression and the reasoning fallacies it produces, we 
should abstain from ever using it.
 For an in depth discussion of  this definition, see Dentith (2014).6
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ten cited in favor of  the broad, neutral definition is the practical consequences of  the ordinary meaning 
of  the expression. Some philosophers argue that, by allowing ‘conspiracy theory’ to be a pejorative ex-
pression, we help powerful people get away with their conspiracies. ‘Conspiracy theory’ can be (and of-
ten is) used as a negative label to dismiss charges of  genuine conspiracies. In order to avoid dismissing 
real conspiracies due to this, they argue, we should stop attaching a negative value to the expression. 
Hence, they conclude, the meaning of  ‘conspiracy theory’ should be re-engineered to mean any theory 
about a conspiracy, and it should not have a negative valence.  7
However, by assuming that every theory involving a conspiracy is a conspiracy theory, these philo-
sophers seem to have changed the meaning of  ‘conspiracy theory’ in a way that is neither warranted nor 
fruitful. It is unwarranted because their claim that attributing the negative label ‘conspiracy theory’ to a 
theory might be employed to dismiss actual conspiracies has not been confirmed by empirical data—in 
fact, some empirical research suggests that labeling a theory a ‘conspiracy theory’ does not reduce belief  
in that theory (Wood 2016). Even granting that their worry is well founded and that a negatively loaded 
definition of  conspiracy theory could help powerful conspirators get away with their conspiracies, this 
worry only applies to negatively loaded definitions that are broad, i.e., that consider all theories about 
conspiracies to be conspiracy theories. If  every theory involving a conspiracy was negatively labeled as a 
negative ‘conspiracy theory’, then any theory involving a conspiracy would run the risk of  being erro-
neously dismissed. On the contrary, narrow definitions which allow for the semantic possibility of  theor-
ies involving conspiracies that are not conspiracy theories, do not fall prey to the same pragmatic con-
cern. The narrow, negatively loaded expression ‘conspiracy theory’ does not warrant the dismissal of  just 
any theory involving a conspiracy. Moreover, adopting a broad, neutral definition is not fruitful because 
 For instance, see Basham & Dentith (2016); Coady (2012). While practical concerns are the most discussed in 7
the literature, other reasons for the minimal re-engineering have been proposed. For instance, it has been sugges-
ted that the ordinary concept is ambiguous and leads to fallacious reasoning (Coady 2018a). This assumption is 
discussed in Napolitano & Reuter (MS). Moreover, it has been suggested that focusing on a neutral and minimal 
definition of  ‘conspiracy theory’ is necessary in order to avoid begging the question whether it is ever rational to 
believe conspiratorial explanations, and what the difference is between this explanation type as opposed to other 
types, more discussed in philosophy of  science. Investigating the epistemic status of  conspiratorial explanations 
could be a worthwhile philosophical project, and a minimal account of  conspiracy theory might be the best revi-
sionary account for this goal. However, I take it that what we’re interested in as a public and as a research com-
munity is not this goal, but rather, we want to understand and address resilient beliefs in wild conspiracies.
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it does not allow for studying conspiracy theories as the phenomenon I described at the beginning of  
this section. Many psychologists, cognitive scientists, and social scientists who have investigated the topic 
of  conspiracy theories have typically focused on conspiracy theories as a problem to be addressed, or as 
an instance of  irrational behavior. The broad account has given rise to several instances of  tension and 
misunderstanding with scholars from those other fields. Some defenders of  the broad conception of  
conspiracy theories have harshly criticized researchers with different approaches to the topic for their 
negative attitude towards conspiracy theories and for ‘pathologizing’ belief  in such theories, thus creating 
a hostile intellectual climate where different research projects on conspiracy theories seem to be talking 
past each other.   8
I believe that the best revisionary definition of  ‘conspiracy theory’ is going to be narrow and negat-
ively loaded, where the narrowing factor explains the irrationality of  conspiracy theories without irra-
tionality being built directly into the definition, in the sense that conspiracy theories are not simply iden-
tified with irrational theories involving conspiracies.  Such a definition allows us to investigate conspiracy 9
theorizing as a phenomenon that seems to have become increasingly common in recent years, and it en-
joys some important advantages over its broad rival. This methodological digression has two important 
upshots. First, the account I propose seeks to capture what we have in mind when we talk about con-
spiracy theories in ordinary language, i.e., the phenomenon of  people believing outlandish theories 
about conspiracies in a way that seems to resist falsification. Second, my account is still an instance of  
conceptual re-engineering for theoretical fruitfulness. Hence, a failure to completely match our intuitions 
about what conspiracy theories are should not be considered a reason to reject it. 
3. Conspiracy Theories 
 See, for instance, the exchange between Basham and Dentith (2016) and  Dieguez et al. (2016). Other examples 8
are Basham (2018); Dentith & Orr (2018); Hagen (2018), Coady (2018b). 
 As it will become clear later on, irrationality is indirectly built into my definition, but in a way that aims at pro9 -
viding understanding of  how and why conspiracy theories are irrational. On my account, conspiracy theories are 
irrational just in virtue of  the way in which they are defined—but they are not directly defined as irrational theo-
ries that involve conspiracies. They are identified with one precise way in which one could irrationally believe in the 
existence of  a conspiracy.
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It is commonly assumed that conspiracy theories are, at the very least, theories that involve conspir-
acies.  I will challenge this assumption. I maintain that being a theory is not even a necessary feature of  10
conspiracy theories, but rather that conspiracy theories are a way of  holding a conspiratorial belief. Any-
one who has ever met a conspiracy theorist will be familiar with the frustrating experience of  trying to 
debunk the relevant belief. No matter what evidence we present to the conspiracy theorist, their confid-
ence seems to remain intact. Evidence that seems to contradict the conspiratorial belief  is likely to be 
seen by the believer as evidence that has been planted as part of  the cover up. I take this to be the core 
feature of  conspiracy theories. Belief  in such theories seems to be completely immune to counter-evid-
ence. In this section, I argue that we identify conspiracy theories with a distinctive way of  holding the 
belief  in the existence of  a conspiracy, namely, one that is self-insulated.  
Roughly, we can say that conspiracy theories are conspiracy-beliefs (beliefs in the existence of  a con-
spiracy) that are self-insulated. Both parts of  this account require clarification. I take a conspiracy to be 
the plotting by a group of  actors—the conspirators—to achieve a goal in their interest, while trying to 
keep their intentions hidden.  Accordingly, a conspiracy-belief  is a belief  that a certain conspiracy has 11
happened in the past or is currently going on. Conspiracy-beliefs are interesting from an epistemological 
point of  view. Believing that a conspiracy is behind a certain event or fact entails believing that the con-
spirators have likely planted evidence against the conspiracy to mislead us. In their attempt to keep their 
actions and intentions secret, conspirators try to orchestrate cover-ups, disseminate misleading evidence, 
and promote alternative narratives for the public to believe. Hence, believing that a conspiracy is going 
on entails believing that things are not as they seem, i.e., that what seems like disconfirming evidence 
should not be taken to actually speak against the existence of  a conspiracy. It follows from what con-
 See Pigden (1995); Keeley (1999); Basham (2001; 2003); Räikkä (2009; 2014); Buenting & Taylor (2010); Dentith 10
(2014).  Sometimes the minimal definition is supplemented by additional feature that theories about conspiracies 
need to have in order to count as conspiracy theories. For instance, Coady (2012) and Feldman (2011) add that the 
conspiratorial explanation should be unofficial.
 While there tends to be general agreement on what conspiracies are, there has been some discussion regarding 11
how powerful the conspirators must be, whether their goal has to be nefarious, and what role the secrecy should 
play. For a discussion of  the definition of  ‘conspiracy’, see Dentith (2014); Dentith and Orr (2018). 
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spiracies are that conspiracy-beliefs will screen off  parts of  the relevant evidence, because if  a conspir-
acy is going on, someone is trying to make us believe otherwise. 
It is part of  what conspiracies are that the evidence against them could be the result of  the conspira-
tors’ attempt to stage a cover up. However, this does not mean that conspiracy-beliefs are always immune 
to revision. Conspiracies may render part of  the available evidence unusable while keeping other eviden-
tial relations intact. For instance, one may encounter contrary evidence that they had no reason to belie-
ve was tampered with by the conspirators. Or one may encounter defeaters for their reasons to believe in 
the existence of  a conspiracy to begin with.  For example, I might believe that most common diseases 
could be cured with acupuncture, but, due to a conspiracy of  the pharmaceutical companies, evidence 
of  this was hidden from the public. My conspiracy-belief  could be shaken if, for instance, I discovered 
that the evidence I had to believe this did not come from a reliable source, or, say, if  acupuncture failed 
to cure my flu. My conspiracy-belief  would not be, on my definition, a conspiracy theory. 
I submit that conspiracy theories are only those conspiracy-beliefs that are self-insulated. What I 
mean by ‘self-insulated’ is that the believers take the conspiracy to neutralize the relevant counter-evid-
ence. No evidence could be presented to them that would cause them to change their minds, because 
any counter-evidence would be dismissed as a fabrication of  the conspirators to steer the public away 
from the truth.  When I say that conspiracy theories are a distinctive way of  holding a conspiracy-belief, 12
I take ‘conspiracy theory’ to refer to an attitude of  the believers, rather than to a type of  explanation. 
However, the content of  the belief  is key. In a conspiracy theory, the conspiracy is what the believers 
take to justify their dismissive attitude towards the evidence, and what plays the role of  immunizing 
one’s conspiracy-belief. By defining conspiracy theories as a certain attitude, I take conspiracy theories to 
be essentially tied to the believers of  the theories. The same explanation could be a conspiracy theory for 
one agent, and not for another, according to how each of  them accommodates counter-evidence. Never-
theless, I still consider conspiracy theories a way of  holding beliefs, rather than a derivative notion of  an 
 This does not imply that, on my account, conspiracy theorists could never abandon their beliefs. They could, 12
but, in a conspiracy theory, this would not be a transition based on the evidence.
 7
independently defined ‘conspiracy theorist’. A conspiracy theorist, on my view, is a person who holds 
one or more self-insulated conspiracy-beliefs—one or more conspiracy theories. 
One more clarification of  self-insulation is necessary. A self-insulated belief  in a conspiracy is a belief  
that is immune to being disconfirmed by counter-evidence. However, the counter-evidence that is rele-
vant to determining whether the belief  is self-insulated should be restricted to counter-evidence that the 
subject could encounter in normal circumstances. In other words, we could say that the evidence to whi-
ch conspiracy theorists are insensitive is any evidence that they might encounter in nearby possible 
worlds. It is possible that a believer in a conspiracy theory might change their mind in far-fetched scena-
rios where they might encounter exceptional evidence, such as if  they could travel to the past and obser-
ve the events, or if  they received an omniscient oracle’s testimony, or if  they could read minds. In my 
view, whether these exceptional and exceptionally unusual pieces of  evidence would lead someone to 
reduce their confidence in a conspiracy-belief  is not relevant to whether or not a conspiracy-belief  coun-
ts as being self-insulated in the target sense. A self-insulated belief  is a belief  that is immune to being 
disconfirmed by the kind of  evidence that is available in normal circumstances. In the rest of  the paper I 
will talk of  self-insulation in this restricted sense.  13
To summarize, a conspiracy theory is the belief  in the existence of  a conspiracy, where the existence 
of  the conspiracy is taken to justify the dismissal of  any seemingly disconfirming evidence that one 
could encounter under normal circumstances. Having defined conspiracy theories, in the next section I 
turn to the question of  their epistemic status. 
4. Are conspiracy theories irrational? 
On my account, conspiracy theories are beliefs in conspiracies that are resistant to revision in light of  
counter-evidence. In this section I argue that, given the empirical nature of  conspiracies, one can never 
 I am grateful to Paul Silva for helping me formulate this point.13
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be rational in holding a belief  in a conspiracy that is self-insulated.  In other words, I argue that it is ir14 -
rational to hold conspiracy theories.  Even though my account of  conspiracy theories is significantly 15
different from traditional accounts, the discussion in this section has substantial implications for those 
traditional accounts that have also claimed that the unfalsifiability of  conspiracy theories does not make 
them irrational to believe. 
The discussion over the epistemic status of  conspiracy theories has traditionally focused on the ques-
tion of  whether it is ever rational to believe theories about conspiracies. Many have argued that it is 
sometimes rational because a conspiracy may be the best explanation of  the evidence.  In the debate, 16
the question of  revising conspiratorial beliefs in light of  new evidence has always been secondary to the 
question of  forming belief  in conspiracies. It is often assumed that the extreme resistance to counter-
evidence is built into what conspiratorial explanations are, and that it is not an epistemically problematic 
feature: 
By invoking a conspiracy hypothesis, large amounts of  “evidence” are thrown into question. This is one of  
the most curious features of  these theories: to my knowledge, conspiracy theories [i.e., explanations in-
volving conspiracies] are the only theories for which evidence against them is actually construed as evidence 
in favor of  them. The more evidence piled up by the authorities in favor of  a given theory, the more the 
conspiracy theorist points to how badly “They” must want us to believe the official story. (Keeley 1999: 
120) 
 Evidential insulation, per se, need not be necessarily irrational. It could be argued that things such as mathemat14 -
ical proofs and necessary truths might be rationally believed in a way that resists revision. In this paper I  only ar-
gue that evidential insulation is problematic for empirical beliefs, including beliefs in conspiracies, and I leave open 
whether evidential insulation is problematic for a priori beliefs. See Casullo 2003.
 It is certainly the case that, on my account, the epistemic status of  conspiracy theories depends on the believer, 15
rather than on the theory to which they subscribe. When I claim that conspiracy theories are irrational, this should 
not be confused with a claim about any theory, but it should be read as ‘beliefs in conspiracies that resist revision 
in the way I described are irrational’, or better, ‘an agent is irrational insofar as they hold a self-insulated conspira-
cy-belief ’. Being rational or irrational is a property of  the agent who holds a certain belief  in a certain way. Howe-
ver, I am not making any claims about the believer as an epistemic agent in general. The focus is on individual 
beliefs and whether they are rationally held. This is the main difference between my account of  conspiracy theory 
and accounts of  what some have called conspiracism, i.e., the tendency of  some theorists to believe in conspiracies 
without good reason (Dentith 2018). Attributing conspiracism to believers runs the risk of  suggesting a stable 
disposition of  the believer to form this type of  irrational beliefs. My account of  conspiracy theories is an account 
of  beliefs in conspiracies that are held irrationally, and not an account of  the people who hold these beliefs. I 
thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this unclarity to me.
 See Pigden (1995); Keeley (1999); Räikkä (2009); Buenting & Taylor (2010); Basham (2011); Coady (2012); Den16 -
tith (2014; 2017); Harris (2018).
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The thought is that, if  one is epistemically justified in believing that a conspiracy is going on, then one is 
epistemically justified in interpreting evidence against one’s belief  as an attempt by the conspirators to 
hide their plot. This argument has much intuitive appeal and has largely gone unchallenged. However, it 
is unclear to what extent the hypothesis of  a conspiracy warrants the dismissal of  disconfirming eviden-
ce. Keeley suggests that theories about conspiracies could potentially be immune to any evidence: 
The worry is that given a situation where all potentially falsifying evidence can be construed as supporting, 
or at worst as neutral evidence, then conspiracy theories are by definition unfalsifiable. In favor of  conspir-
acy theorists, it should be noted that this unfalsifiability is not as ad hoc as it might initially seem, due to the 
active nature of  the investigated, just noted. It is not ad hoc to suppose that false and misleading data will 
be thrown your way when one supposes that there is somebody out there actively throwing that data at you. 
(Keeley 1999: 121) 
According to Keeley and those who have endorsed his argument, theories about conspiracies can be un-
falsifiable, and this is not problematic because of  the active nature of  conspiracies.  On this view, hold17 -
ing an unfalsifiable conspiratorial explanation can be rationally permissible. Hence, proponents of  the 
view take it that it is sometimes rationally permissible to hold the belief  in the existence of  a conspiracy 
that is immune to being disconfirmed. I spend the remainder of  this section arguing against this claim. 
Pace Keeley, not all evidence against the conspiratorial explanation can be neutralized by the belief  that 
the conspirators are staging a cover-up.  
To make the point, I will rely on some insights from Bayesian epistemology. Bayesianism gives us a 
theoretical framework to evaluate how relevant new evidence is to the conspiratorial hypothesis, given 
the background assumption that, if  the conspiracy is going on, the conspirators are trying to keep their 
intentions and actions secret. The core features of  the Bayesian model are (i) that the level of  confid-
ence in a hypothesis can be represented with a credence value varying from 1 to 0, where 1 corresponds 
to certainty in the truth of  the hypothesis, 0 corresponds to certainty in its falsehood, and 0.5 to equal 
 Basham 2001: 268; 2003: 93; Dentith 2017: 9; Harris 2018: 243-245. For Keeley, the conspiracy theory will be 17
abandoned when the skepticism that is required in order to maintain the belief  in the conspiracy becomes ‘more 
than we can stomach’ (1999:126). The resilience to counter-evidence is not a problem per se, of  conspiracy theor-
ies. However, in order to maintain the belief  in the conspiracy, one would have to assume the involvement of  
more and more institutions and people until the amount of  scepticism required is simply too much, and the belief  
in the conspiracy is abandoned. 
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confidence in its truth and its falsity; (ii) that ideally rational agents have credences that can be modeled 
by probability functions; and (iii) that agents learn from new evidence by updating their credence using 
conditionalization.   18
Using these terms, we can define a conspiracy theory as the belief  in the existence of  a conspiracy C 
such that the credence in the existence of  a conspiracy P(C|E)=P(C), for any evidence E that one might 
encounter in normal circumstances.  The Bayesian framework allows us to identify two conditions un19 -
der which discovering new evidence will not have any effect on a rational agent’s belief: certainty and 
irrelevance.  Let’s consider each of  these. 20
First, one could be certain that there is a conspiracy. If  one’s credence in a hypothesis P(H)=1, then 
the conditional probability of  the hypothesis on the evidence is P(H|E)=1, for any new evidence E that 
the agent may encounter. Let’s consider the case in which h is a conspiratorial hypothesis, such as: 
Con: The Twin Towers fell as the result of  a controlled demolition, intended by government 
officials.  
Imagine a believer who is certain of  the truth of  Con. Could her belief  in Con be an instance of  a 
rationally had conspiracy theory? First, I am inclined to say that conspiracy-beliefs that are immune to 
revision because of  certainty would not count as conspiracy theories on my account. Conspiracy theories are 
beliefs that are insulated because the evidence is dismissed by appeal to the conspirators’ attempt to hide 
the truth. If  one were certain that the Twin Towers were demolished, then certainty, rather than the be-
lief  that the conspirators are trying to hide their plot, would guarantee the immunity to revision (any 
non-conspiratorial hypothesis would be equally immune to revision). Hence, it is not clear that certainty 
in the existence of  a conspiracy would count as a conspiracy theory, and thus that it would constitute an 
 For an introduction to Bayesian confirmation theory see Strevens (MS), Bovens & Hartmann (2003).18
 It would still count as a conspiracy theory if  the confidence in the existence of  a conspiracy could only be 19
brought down to a certain threshold but no lower. In that case, even though the conspiracy-belief  would not be 
totally immune to revision in light of  new evidence, it would still be immune to revision in the sense that it could 
never be fully disconfirmed by counter-evidence.
 Silva (forthcoming) makes a similar point regarding the rationality of  sexist and racist beliefs.20
 11
instance of  a rationally had conspiracy theory. Moreover, it is hard to see how one could rationally come 
to be certain of  an empirical claim such as the existence of  a conspiracy. Beliefs in the existence of  se-
cretive plots are not the kind of  thing that one could rationally come to believe beyond doubt. Thus, the 
certainty condition can never justify the evidential insulation of  conspiracy theories. So let’s move on to 
the second condition that could justify conspiracy theories’ dismissal of  disconfirming evidence: probab-
ilistic irrelevance. 
The irrelevance condition is the more interesting condition because it seems to be grounding Keeley’s 
claim that, with conspiratorial beliefs, “all potentially falsifying evidence can be construed as supporting, 
or at worst as neutral evidence” (1999). Bayesian confirmation theory provides a quantitative method for 
assessing the impact of  new evidence on hypotheses, based on the general principle that, if  a particular 
observation is more likely given the truth of  the hypothesis, than it is given its falsehood, then the ob-
servation is evidence in favor of  the theory. An observation is probabilistically irrelevant to the hypo-
thesis if  it is assigned the same probability on the assumption that the hypothesis is true and that it is 
false. Keeley seems to be arguing that some conspiratorial explanations satisfy the irrelevance condition. 
Under the irrelevance condition, a belief  in a conspiratorial hypothesis is immune to being disconfirmed 
because the seemingly disconfirming observation is equally predicted by the truth and falsity of  the hy-
pothesis. Given that conspiracies are plots designed by agents trying to keep their intentions and actions 
secret, conspiratorial explanations sometimes predict that the conspirators are fabricating misleading 
evidence in order to hide the truth. Seemingly disconfirming evidence can be just as likely on the as-
sumption of  a conspiracy as it is on the assumption that there is no conspiracy. And this, according to 
Keeley, could in some cases hold for any potential disconfirming evidence.   21
Can conspiracy theories be rationally held in virtue of  the probabilistic irrelevance condition? I be-
lieve that a conspiratorial explanation can only be immune to being disconfirmed by any new evidence if  
 I find it hard to make sense of  Keeley’s claim that seemingly disconfirming evidence could be construed as 21
supporting the conspiratorial explanation (rather than just neutral), because it is difficult to imagine a case in 
which the disconfirming evidence is more strongly predicted by the conspiratorial explanation than by its nega-
tion. It seems to be part of  what seemingly disconfirming evidence is that it cannot support the conspiracy hypo-
thesis more than its negation.
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it remains so general that it makes no specific predictions. A conspiratorial explanation of  a fact or event 
seems to be constituted by two complementary claims: a conspiracy claim, according to which the activity 
of  a group of  agents is behind some fact or event, and a cover-up claim, which states that these agents are 
planting misleading evidence in order to hide their conspiratorial activity. If  the conspiratorial explana-
tion stays at a high level of  generality, then it would indeed be able to account for any evidence that 
might arise. By not committing to a precise account of  how the conspiratorial activity was carried out 
and by whom in the conspiracy claim, the explanation leaves open all possibilities for the kind of  mis-
leading evidence that is expected by the cover-up claim. So, no matter what is offered as disconfirming 
evidence, it can be dismissed as a fabrication of  the conspirators. Consider a very vague version of  Con, 
according to which: 
Con Gen: The attacks on 9/11 were part of  a conspiracy of  agents who are trying to hide the truth. 
In Con Gen, the general conspiracy claim that someone orchestrated the attacks on 9/11 is compat-
ible with the most general cover-up claim that someone is hiding the truth. Any disconfirming evidence 
could have been planted by whoever is behind the attacks. Even though no explosive was found on the 
site of  the alleged demolition, this could be a false report of  the investigators, or of  the media. Or it is 
possible that the Twin Towers weren’t demolished, but whatever happened to them, someone within the 
US was behind it. Even though there is no evidence of  people entering the building with large amounts 
of  explosives during the days prior to the attacks, someone may in fact be hiding evidence of  this, or the 
explosive material may have been brought inside bit by bit over a very long span of  time. The generality 
of  the conspiracy claim, together with the cover-up claim allow Con Gen to accommodate any relevant 
disconfirming evidence. However, Con Gen is a bad explanation of  the evidence, because it fails to 
make specific predictions. It just claims that 9/11 was an inside job, and “they” are trying to make us 
believe otherwise. Hence, we should expect evidence that disconfirms the conspiratorial account. But 
this is far from being a prediction. We would not say that a scientific theory makes predictions if  it 
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claims that at some point some evidence in favor of  it will come up. Making genuine predictions re-
quires more than this.  22
If  the conspiracy claim of  the conspiratorial explanation takes a precise form, then the level of  im-
munization will be constrained accordingly in the cover-up claim. When the hypothesis is made more 
precise regarding the exact form of  the conspiratorial activity, including who is involved and why, it can 
make specific predictions regarding what counter-evidence can be expected and which sources of  in-
formation are not to be trusted. A more precise conspiratorial hypothesis makes genuine predictions, but 
it also leaves open the possibility of  encountering disconfirming evidence should the predictions fail to 
come true. This disconfirming evidence will have an effect on a rational agent's confidence in the truth 
of  the hypothesis. Let’s now consider a specific version of  Con, according to which:  
Con Spec:  Government officials staged the attack to the Twin Towers on 9/11. The buildings collapsed 
as the result of  a controlled demolition. In fact, the  jet-fuel-induced fires in the 
Twin  Towers  could not have melted steel. Nano-thermite was secretly brought inside the 
buildings and planted in the metal beams supporting the buildings to demolish them. 
This hypothesis is specific enough to provide a genuine explanation of  the events, and it makes test-
able predictions. But, by doing so, it makes itself  vulnerable to disconfirming evidence. The evidence 
that insufficient amount of  explosive residue was found on the site is more likely on the hypothesis that 
Con Spec is false, than on the hypothesis that it is true. Similarly, other observations would disconfirm 
Con Spec, including the fact that the majority of  world’s experts agree that the collapse resulted from 
the structural damage produced by the jet-fuel-induced fires, the amount of  thermite necessary to cut 
steel beams vertically is enormous and not likely to have been brought into the building in secret, and so 
on.  Once a specific version of  the conspiratorial explanation is proposed, then the cover-up claim must 23
also take a determinate form, and disconfirming evidence must be taken into account. Of  course, a be-
liever could maintain a coherent set of  beliefs by altering the explanation—both the explanation of  the 
 In a similar fashion, a conspiratorial hypothesis that identified all-powerful conspirators would be immune to 22
being disconfirmed but equally incapable of  making genuine predictions. I elaborate this point in section 5.2.
 For instance, Dunbar & Reagan (2006).23
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conspiratorial activity, and the explanation of  who is involved in covering it up—as counter-evidence 
arises. However, these alterations would be ad hoc and would make the believer irresponsive to the evid-
ence in a problematic way. While it is always possible to maintain a coherent set of  beliefs by using the 
conspiracy claim to modify one’s predictions, doing so renders one’s belief  irrational because one is not 
appropriately responding to the evidence.  24
Detailed conspiratorial hypotheses cannot rationally resist falsification in light of  any disconfirming 
evidence. Only very general conspiratorial hypotheses, which do not make any specific claims about how 
the conspiracy was carried out and who is involved, can. However, the resilience of  these conspiratorial 
hypotheses comes at the cost of  indeterminacy and lack of  predictive power. These hypotheses are not 
explanations of  the evidence because they provide little understanding of  the phenomena they purport 
to explain.  Could an agent rationally hold a very general, indeterminate conspiracy theory? First, it is 25
hard to see what kind of  evidence could support forming the belief  in such a theory, other than the dis-
belief  in the received account. In order to avoid committing to a specific conspiratorial and cover-up 
claim, they need to remain at such a level of  generality that is more similar to scepticism in the received 
account than to a genuine hypothesis. However, disbelief  in the received account does not warrant posit-
ive belief  in the existence of  a conspiracy. Secondly, if  the conspiratorial hypothesis is based on evidence 
rather than just scepticism in the received account, for any general conspiratorial hypothesis there will be 
 I am sympathetic to the argument made by Clarke (2002) that conspiracy theories often have the characteristics 24
of  what Lakatos (1978) referred to as degenerating research programs. A degenerating research program is a research 
program in which the participants are dedicated to protecting the core of  a theory from falsification by altering 
auxiliary hypotheses and initial conditions in light of  the new disconfirming evidence. I agree with Clarke that 
conspiracy theories are often rendered immune to falsification in this problematic way. It has been objected to 
Clarke that the exact point at which a conspiracy theory becomes a degenerating research program is unclear 
(Harris 2018). However, a similar concern does not apply to my account, since I take conspiracy theories to be the 
extreme case of  conspiracy-beliefs held in such a way as to be completely immune to disconfirmation in nearby 
possible worlds. If  there is a such a point at which a research program becomes a degenerating one, conspiratorial 
explanations whose believers will retain in light of  any disconfirming evidence one could encounter are an ex-
ample of  that.
 I take this to be a further advantage of  my account of  conspiracy theories over traditional ones. Some conspir25 -
acy-beliefs which we would ordinarily call ‘conspiracy theories’ do not seem to meet the threshold for being con-
sidered explanations or theories; they do not make any specific predictions, and they don’t explain any evidence. 
Muirhead & Rosenblum (2019) refer to this phenomenon of  conspiracies without theories as the new conspiracism. 
In the traditional account, conspiracy-beliefs of  this kind would not be called ‘conspiracy theories’. By identifying 
conspiracy theories with self-insulated conspiracy-beliefs, my account of  conspiracy theories has the advantage of  
including these conspiracy-beliefs that do not meet the conditions for being considered explanations or theories.
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a more specific one that is a better explanation of  the evidence in virtue of  exhibiting more epistemic 
virtues, and should as such be preferred. 
I take it that neither of  the two conditions (certainty and irrelevance) that would render the evidence 
irrelevant to a rational agent’s credence in a conspiratorial hypothesis can justify conspiracy theories’ 
evidential insulation. Certainty is not a good candidate because, given the empirical nature of  conspir-
acies, one could never be rationally certain of  the existence of  a conspiracy. As for probabilistic irrelev-
ance, it only applies to conspiracy claims so general that they can barely be considered explanations, and 
are not supported by evidence so as to warrant positive belief  in them. Genuine explanations, those spe-
cific enough to make predictions regarding what disconfirming evidence is to be expected, will either 
have to be disconfirmed by new evidence, or will have to be adjusted to accommodate for the new evid-
ence in an ad hoc way. It follows that one could never rationally hold the belief  in a conspiracy that is 
immune to being disconfirmed by counter-evidence. So, conspiracy theories as self-insulated conspiracy-
beliefs can never be rationally held. Having restricted self-insulation to immunity in nearby possible 
worlds, we cannot claim that conspiracy theories are necessarily irrational. However, we can say that they 
are irrational to hold in this world and all the nearby possible worlds in which evidence coming from 
things like omniscient oracles, time travel, and mind reading are not available. 
This analysis also shows that the resistance to revision that many conspiracy theorists exhibit is better 
understood as a feature of  the believers, as my account suggests, rather than of  the theories. Conspirato-
rial beliefs may be resistant to revision for different reasons having to do both with the content of  the 
theory and with the agent’s epistemic flaws, extra-epistemic motives and biases. In this section I have 
shown that the content of  the theory alone cannot justify evidential insulation. If  we are interested in 
conspiracy theories that are unfalsifiable, we need to look at the individuals’ beliefs. 
In the next section, I address two objections to my account and point out some of  its upshots. The 
first objection concerns the philosophical methodology on which my account is based. The second ob-
jection targets some assumptions I made in this section regarding the epistemic standards for conspira-
torial explanations. 
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5. Objections and replies 
5.1.   The change in meaning is a change in topic 
Some readers might worry that re-engineering the expression ‘conspiracy theory’ as evidence-insu-
lated beliefs will push the meaning of  this expression too far from its current one. They might object 
that, by changing the intension and extension of  the concept so radically, we have changed the topic of  
our inquiry. In fact, the way in which the expression is currently employed seems to refer to theories 
about conspiracies of  a certain kind, rather than beliefs about conspiracies. Instead, on my view, the 
same theory could count as a conspiracy theory in some cases but not in others, according to the way in 
which each individual believer holds the conspiracy-belief  (if  it is evidentially insulated or not). In this 
section I address two related worries: the general worry that the methodology of  conceptual engineer-
ing, which I employ, is a flawed methodology, and the worry that my proposal in particular is uninterest-
ing because it changes the meaning of  ‘conspiracy theory’ too radically.  
The first objection can be seen as an instance of  the well-known Strawsonian challenge to Carnap’s 
method of  conceptual explication (Strawson 1963). In a nutshell, Strawson claims that any revisionary 
project that advocates for changing the extension and intension of  a concept is bound to fail because, 
even in the most successful case, it necessarily entails a change in topic. While I think there are convin-
cing ways of  successfully rebutting the Strawsonian challenge, I will not consider them here, as this falls 
outside of  the scope of  this paper.  Notice that my account is not the only one engaged in conceptual 26
engineering. The widely accepted definition of  conspiracy theory as any explanation involving a conspir-
acy is also a revisionary definition. In fact, in its ordinary use, ‘conspiracy theory’ has a negative valence, 
and does not refer to just any explanation about a conspiracy. This fact is acknowledged by the pro-
ponents of  the broad definition. If  conceptual re-engineering is a flawed methodology, then the most 
popular alternative to my account is just as doomed.  
 See, for instance Cappelen (2018); Haslanger (forthcoming); Nado (2019); Prinzing (2017); Thomasson (forth26 -
coming); Sawyer (2018).
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In its more specific sense, this objection could be read as an objection against my view in particular. 
One could argue that, while conceptual engineering may in general be a viable philosophical methodolo-
gy, and changes in concepts’ extensions and intensions may succeed at maintaining the same topic as the 
original concept, the account I propose is just too much of  a shift, and fails to do so. I want respond to 
this objection by suggesting that the both the change in intension and in extension may not be as radical 
as they initially appear.  
First, the focus on the extreme resistance to counter-evidence as a distinctive feature of  conspiracy 
theorizing neatly fits with the ordinary meaning of  ‘conspiracy theory’. Conspiracy theories have often 
been compared to paranoid ideation,  and more recently to impostor syndrome (Hawley 2019). One of  27
the reasons for this parallel is this self-sealing property that they seem to have (Sunstein and Vermeule 
2008; Cassam 2019). In conspiracy theories, just like in paranoid ideation and impostor syndrome, the 
core of  the beliefs set includes the reasons to discredit disconfirming evidence and many conspiratorial 
beliefs seem to be ‘sealed’ and totally insensitive to contradicting information. The shift from theory to 
belief  is indeed a change of  perspective. However, it is a way of  focusing on what has been widely re-
cognized as a central feature of  conspiracy theorizing—namely, a distinctive way in which believers resist 
revising their beliefs in light of  new evidence.  
Moreover, even the extension of  the ordinary concept may, to a large extent, be preserved. The ordi-
nary expression ‘conspiracy theory’ seems to imply negative value, indicating theories about conspiracies 
that are somehow irrational to believe, outlandish, or simply bad theories about conspiracies. The para-
digmatic cases of  theories that are currently called ‘conspiracy theories’—the outlandish and absurd ones
—might fall under the revised concept, and might do so for many of  their believers. In fact, it seems 
plausible to suppose that the reason why such outlandish theories have survived over the years, given 
that that there’s overwhelming and easily available evidence against them, is that most people’s beliefs in 
these theories are immune to rational criticism and disconfirming evidence. Even though only empirical 
 See, for instance, Barkun (2003); Fenster (1999); Hofstadter (1965).27
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investigations could tell us whether this is actually the case, it is plausible that the extension of  the con-
cept would to a large extent be preserved despite the change in meaning I advocate for. 
While my proposal advocates for a shift in meaning, I don’t think that focusing on stubbornly held 
beliefs in conspiracies represents a shift in topic. 
Last, from a methodological point of  view, my account is aimed at promoting the understanding of  
the phenomenon of  conspiracy theories. The change in meaning I propose is targeted to a specific theore-
tical discussion of  conspiracy theories. The ordinary expression need not be affected by it.  Accordingly, 28
our intuitions about what a conspiracy theory is are only subordinate to the potential theoretical advan-
tages that a revisionary account might have. The main advantage of  understanding conspiracy theories 
as self-insulated conspiracy-beliefs rather than as mere theories involving conspiracies, is that it allows 
for empirical studies in the psychology of  conspiracy theorists without having to make problematic as-
sumptions about the rationality of  believing conspiracies. On my account, evidential insulation makes 
conspiracy theories irrational and warrants a psychological approach to explain why people have such 
beliefs. Moreover, differently from traditional accounts of  conspiracy theories, on my account conspira-
cy theories are understood as a distinctive phenomenon of  people having epistemically problematic be-
liefs regarding conspiracies. My proposal could be seen as an attempt to carve out a space for conspiracy 
theories as a phenomenon irreducible to other epistemic phenomena that could explain evidence resi-
stance (e.g., echo chambers and filter bubbles). As a working definition, the one I propose looks like a 
promising way to further our understanding of  conspiracy theorizing. These considerations should have 
priority over our intuitions about what conspiracy theories are. 
5.2.   Predictions, reflexivity and ad hoc-ness in conspiratorial explanations 
In §4, I argued that it is never permissible to hold a belief  in a conspiracy that is self-insulated. My 
discussion of  the second condition, probabilistic irrelevance, relied on the two assumptions that an ex-
 This approach to the problem is also compatible with the existence of  different revisionary accounts of  ‘con28 -
spiracy theory’.
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planation that does not predict novel observations is worse than one which does, and that an explanation 
that was adjusted in light of  new evidence to resist falsification would be ad hoc and thus irrational to 
believe. One might object that, given what conspiracies are and how they differ from explanations of  
natural phenomena, these assumptions are unwarranted in our case (Keeley 1999; 2019; Harris 2018). 
Let’s consider the first claim, that a general conspiratorial hypothesis which does not make specific 
predictions is a worse hypothesis than one which does. Harris (2018) argues that conspiratorial hypothe-
ses might predict novel observations: 
[C]onspiracy theorists may predict that evidence apparently conflicting with the conspiracy theory will be 
presented, and such predictions will ordinarily be borne out. Hence, it would be inaccurate to claim that 
conspiracy theories are not capable of  predicting novel observations. (Harris 2018: 247) 
I take it that a genuine prediction is a claim that a particular state of  affairs will occur. In order to predict 
a novel observation, a conspiracy theorist would have to predict what sort of  seemingly disconfirming 
evidence will be encountered, and who is involved in trying to hide the truth of  the conspiracy. Only a 
specific conspiratorial hypothesis, consisting of  a specific conspiracy claim and cover-up claim, can do 
this. 
Harris might grant this point, yet still deny that a lack of  predictive power is problematic for conspir-
acy theories. He claims, following Keeley (1999), that: 
Even if  one denies that conspiracy theories can predict novel facts, it is not clear that this would be a strike 
against such theories. As Keeley points out, the objects whose behavior is described by conspiracy theories 
are unlike the objects of  ordinary empirical sciences insofar as the objects of  conspiracy theories can be 
expected to actively resist investigation. (Harris 2018: 247) 
Since the conspirators are trying to mislead us to avoid detection, Harris and Keeley argue, it is unclear 
why we would expect a good theory about a conspiracy to be able to predict their moves. In other 
words, predicting novel observations is not necessarily a feature of  good conspiratorial explanations. 
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While it is often the case that the nature of  the explanandum is different in the case of  conspiratorial 
explanations than in the case of  explanations of  natural phenomena,  the claim that this difference war29 -
rants different criteria for evaluating hypotheses is controversial. Sometimes conspiratorial explanations 
are explanations of  social phenomena. If  we assume that social systems are indeterministic and that the 
behavior of  agents cannot be predicted, then we should not expect to be able to understand social phe-
nomena at all. Conspiratorial or not, explanations of  people’s motives and intentions could not be as-
sessed.    30
On the other hand, if  we assume that, to some extent, we can predict people’s behavior and under-
stand their intentions, we would expect explanations of  social phenomena to be similar to other empiri-
cal explanations and subject to the same standards of  assessment, including the ability to predict novel 
observations, explanatory power, explanatory depth, and unification. While conspiratorial explanations 
which are detailed accounts may exhibit these traits, general ones lack the determinateness necessary to 
provide significant understanding of  the phenomena they are formulated to explain.  
The second claim, that specific conspiratorial hypotheses would have to be falsified by disconfirming 
evidence that the theory failed to predict, or else be irrational in virtue of  being ad hoc, could be criti-
cized on similar grounds. In comparing conspiratorial and scientific explanations, Keeley notices that: 
[C]onspiratorial explanations generally engage social behavior of  purposive agents, whereas the natural sci-
ences typically restricts its studies to non-agents (or at least agents lacking an agenda to interfere with their 
investigations). The fact of  the matter is that the scientific study of  human agents by humans is fraught and 
methodologically contested, whether it be social psychology, economic behavior, or sexuality. When your 
research subjects can read your results and explanations of  their behavior—and then respond with changed 
behavior—science gets a lot more difficult, and the easy proclamations of  natural science (including falsi-
fication) go by the wayside. (Keeley 2019: 429) 
 Conspiratorial explanans always involve the intervention of  human agents, but not all explananda are social 29
phenomena. For instance, the theory that the Earth is flat, and that some powerful people in the world are trying 
to keep it a secret, is supposed to be an explanation of  different natural observations. Similarly, the hypothesis that 
vaccines are a cause of  autism, and that there is a conspiracy of  pharmaceutical companies trying to hide the 
truth, is an explanation of  natural observations.
 In fact, if  anything, conspiratorial explanations would fare worse than non-conspiratorial ones because they 30
attribute more intentionality to agents than their non-conspiratorial rivals. See Mandik (2007).
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So, one could grant that explanations in the social domain are not subject to different standards of  eva-
luation, but argue that resistance to falsification is warranted for those domains subject to reflexive predic-
tion problems. In domains where the behavior of  the object of  investigation can be influenced by know-
ledge of  the explanations proposed, falsifiability does not seem to be a valid requirement to expect of  a 
hypothesis. Conspiratorial explanations may be explanations of  this kind. One could argue that, if  a con-
spiratorial hypothesis’ predictions fail to obtain this need not necessarily disprove the theory, because it 
could also indicate that the conspirators changed their behavior after the conspiratorial explanation was 
made known to them. 
I agree with Keeley that reflexive predictions could occur in conspiratorial explanations, thus altering 
the disconfirming effect that failed predictions should have on the hypothesis.  However, there are two 31
reasons to resist the conclusion that reflexivity problems can justify conspiratorial explanations’ im-
munity to falsification. First, the existence of  reflexive predictions is typically employed to criticize the 
methodology of  some social sciences, rather than to claim that, in these fields, unfalsifiable theories are 
warranted.  Similarly, the possibility of  reflexive predictions seems to speak in favor of  the difficulty 32
(and in some extreme cases impossibility) to formulate good conspiratorial explanations, rather than 
supporting the claim that explanations which make reflexive predictions can be valid explanations even 
though they cannot be falsified by seemingly disconfirming evidence. If  we believe that the subject of  
our investigation could potentially interfere with all the predictions that our theory makes, then we 
should give up the hope of  formulating a good conspiratorial explanation of  the events. We should 
come to terms with the impossibility of  arriving at the truth, and suspend judgment on the matter, 
rather than claiming that unfalsifiability is not a problematic feature of  conspiratorial explanations. 
Second, not all the predictions made by conspiratorial hypotheses are of  the kind that can give rise to 
reflexivity worries. Recall the distinction between the conspiracy claim and the cover-up claim that con-
stitute a conspiratorial hypothesis. The conspiracy claim states that the activity of  a certain group of  
 For a Bayesian analysis of  how reflexivity alters confirmation relations see Kopec (2011).31
 For a discussion of  the methodological problems generated by reflexive predictions, see Buck (1963); Grün32 -
baum (1963); Romanos (1973); Vetterling (1976).
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agents is behind a fact or event. The cover-up claim makes predictions as to what kind of  counter-evi-
dence will be encountered. While the conspirators might change their behavior to falsify the cover-up 
claim’s predictions, many of  the conspiracy claim’s predictions cannot be altered by the conspirators’ 
behavior in the same way. Especially in those cases where a conspiracy is postulated to explain a past 
event, reflexivity is not a problem for the conspiracy claim’s predictions relative to who is involved in the 
conspiracy and how the conspiratorial activity was carried out. 
Nothing about the nature of  conspiratorial explanations allows us to assess them according to  stan-
dards different from other empirical explanations. Just like any other explanations, very general conspira-
torial explanations that do not make novel predictions and lack other explanatory virtues are bad expla-
nations, and conspiratorial explanations that are modified in light of  new evidence to resist falsification 
are problematically ad hoc. 
5.3   Testimonial insulation 
Another objection against the idea that conspiracy theories as insulated beliefs are irrational is that, 
given that evidence of  conspiracy theories in normal circumstances is rarely first hand, one could be ra-
tional in resisting revision if  one mistrusted the sources from which counter-evidence could be obtained. 
Hence, one could rationally hold a conspiracy-belief  that is immune to revision in normal circumstances.  
In order to respond to this objection, we need to consider two different scenarios: (i) all of  the sour-
ces of  evidence relevant to the existence of  the conspiracy are deemed untrustworthy for reasons inde-
pendent of  the conspiracy; (ii) the sources are discredited after receiving the conflicting testimony, on 
the basis of  the belief  in the conspiracy. It should become clear that (i) is a case in which it is rational to 
resist revision in light of  any testimonial evidence, but (i) does not represent an instance of  conspiracy 
theory in the relevant sense. On the other hand (ii) is a genuine case of  conspiracy theory, but it is not an 
instance of  a rationally held one. 
Let’s consider each case with an example. Imagine a person, Anna, who believes that vaccines cause 
autism, and that a conspiracy of  the pharmaceutical companies is hiding the truth on this issue. If  Anna 
had independent reasons to mistrust scientists, doctors, news outlets, and anyone else who may be pro-
viding testimony that could disconfirm her theory, then it would seem that Anna is behaving rationally 
when ignoring these sources and remaining confident in her conspiracy-belief. But it would also be clear 
that Anna’s belief  is not a conspiracy theory in the relevant sense. In fact, her resistance to counter-evi-
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dence is not due to her belief  that a conspiracy is going on, but rather to her independent reasons not to 
trust some sources of  information relevant to the issue of  whether vaccines cause autism. Her belief  
might be rationally immune to disconfirmation, but it is not a conspiracy theory.  
On the other hand, imagine that after forming her conspiracy-belief, Anna received testimonial 
counter-evidence from sources that her initial conspiratorial explanation gave no reasons to mistrust. If  
she then demoted these sources on the basis that, given what they testify, the conspirators must have 
influenced them (for instance, by deceiving them or by buying their complicity) or that they may them-
selves be part of  the group of  conspirators, then the insulated belief  would count as a conspiracy theory. 
The conspiracy is what is taken to justify the dismissal of  the relevant evidence. However, it would be 
irrational for Anna to demote the new sources on the basis of  her conspiratorial belief. As I argued in 
§4, the new testimony could only be accounted for by a vague theory which did not commit to a specific 
cover-up claim. If  she had a more specific conspiratorial hypothesis, then conflicting testimony from 
sources who were not initially thought to be involved in the conspiracy should affect (at least minimally) 
her confidence. A failure to respond to testimonial evidence would make her belief  an irrational conspir-
acy theory. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have offered an account of  conspiracy theories as self-insulated beliefs in the existence 
of  conspiracies. I have argued that conspiracy theories so understood are always irrational.  
A big advantage of  my account over the alternative broad and neutral understanding of  ‘conspiracy 
theory’ is that it allows for treating conspiracy theories as a specific epistemic phenomenon that has been 
playing an important role in the political and social climate of  the past decade. Traditional accounts of  
conspiracy theories, which identify conspiracy theories with conspiratorial explanations, have failed to 
recognize the deeply problematic aspects—both political and epistemic—of  the phenomenon of  con-
spiracy theorizing, and have often depicted conspiracy theorists as analogous to investigative journalists. 
Focusing on conspiracy theories as insulated conspiracy-beliefs is an attempt to promote an investigation 
of  the phenomenon of  conspiracy theories as a distinctive one, to be understood in its current political 
and social function.  33
 Such as the role of  conspiracy theories as forms of  political propaganda (Cassam 2019).33
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In this sense, this account of  conspiracy theories is in line with other research in social epistemology 
aimed at making sense of  the seemingly absurd opinions that some people hold (despite the easy and 
widespread access to information that the internet grants), without having to assume that, somehow, 
these people have stopped being responsive to the demands of  truth and rationality.  Conspiracy theor34 -
ies are an irrational way of  holding conspiracy-beliefs. However, they are seductive explanations which 
can easily accommodate disconfirming evidence, because they can be made internally coherent by dis-
missing the evidence as a fabrication of  the conspirators. Only when we look closely at the dynamics of  
the dismissal of  counter-evidence it becomes apparent that conspiracy theorists can only maintain the 
internal coherence of  their theories by not being adequately responsive to the evidence—either by ad-
opting a poor, indeterminate explanation of  the evidence, or by adopting a more specific hypothesis but 
failing to respond to new evidence.  35
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